The sharing of electronic health records (EHRs) has great positive significance for research of disease and doctors' diagnosis. In recent years, cloud-based electronic medical record sharing scheme has brought a lot of conveniences, but the centralization of cloud exposes threats inevitably to data security and privacy preservation. Blockchain technology can be seen as a promising solution to address these problems on account of its unique propertis of decentration, anonymity, unforgeability and verifiability. In this paper, we propose a blockchain based secure and privacy-preserving EHR sharing protocol. Data requester can search desired keyword from data provider to find relevant EHRs on the EHR consortium blockchain and get the re-encryption ciphertext from cloud server after getting the data owner's authorization. The scheme mainly uses searchable encryption and conditional proxy re-encryption to realize data security, privacy preservation, and access control. Furthermore, proof of authorization is designed as the consensus mechanism for consortium blockchain to guarantee system's availability. Security analysis demonstrates that the proposed protocol can achieve security goals. Besides, we emulate the cryptographic primitives and implement the proposed scheme on Ethereum platform. Performance evaluation shows that the proposed scheme has high computational efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
With high-speed development of information technology and Internet technology, Electronic Health Records (EHRs), as a replacement of traditional manuscript patient's health records on paper, solve the problems of paper that easy to lose, difficult to save for a long time and not easy to carry. For the research of disease, doctors or medical institutions need abundant EHRs which contain similar or related disease to compare and analyze for seeking better therapeutic methods [1] . For a patient, he/she may not be able to remember his/her medical history or can't describe detailed symptoms. EHR sharing is a promising solution for these problems, which can help doctors know more about patients, such that improving the accuracy of disease diagnosis.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Xiaochun Cheng . EHR sharing has attracted extensive attentions and researches from industry and academia, where the most noteworthy issues are privacy preservation, data security and interoperability [2] . First, EHRs include personal and high privacy-sensitive information, thus privacy preservation is the guard of patients' reputation and benefit. Second, only the authentic data in EHRs can reflect the real situation and promote the development of medical treatment. On the contrary, the forged or modified data reduces the effective utilization of EHRs. Additionally, the interoperability can help patients to control the access right of their EHRs and enhance mobility of EHRs between different healthcare institutions.
In response to these questions, cloud technology has been put forward for health data storage, management and sharing [3] - [8] . These works use different cryptographic algorithms and cloud technology to design access control schemes for EHR sharing to realizing privacy preservation and data security. Although these works provide promising solutions for EHR sharing in cloud environment and pay high attention to data security and privacy protection, there still remains one severe challenge: the cloud is supposed to be trusted in storing and managing the data. The pattern of cloudbased EHR sharing relies on third-party which may steal, leak, tamper or abuse the data once they are under attacks or lack of monitoring. Despite that many cryptographic primitives are applied in different schemes [4] - [7] , the problem of single point failure can't be solved due to the centralization characteristic of cloud.
Fortunately, blockchain technology as a distributed public ledger is a prospective solution to figure out security issues in EHR sharing after the cloud-based system [9] . Due to the fact that the blockchain is open and transparent, EHR sharing based on blockchain can help patients to control access permission and supervise the utilization of their EHRs. Even though blockchain technology has a series of advantages for building EHR sharing system, we still face the following challenges: 1) How to achieve data privacy preservation with EHR searchability in blockchain? 2) How to realize that only the patient and authorized entities can access the EHR? 3) How to design the data structure and consensus mechanism of consortium blockchain established by different entities to maintain the system running efficiently and normally?
In order to address the above challenges, we propose a cloud-assisted blockchain scheme which combines searchable encryption and proxy re-encryption technology to realize privacy preservation and data security for EHR sharing. In this work, the keyword ciphertext stored in consortium blockchain ensures users to find expected EHRs and protects data security with searchability. Besides, the combination with proxy re-encryption and cloud technology is adopted to guarantee that only authorized entities can access the EHRs. We also design a suitable data structure and consensus mechanism of consortium blockchain to ensure high-efficiency, reliability, and safety of the entire system. In summary, the contributions of our scheme are threefolds as follows. • We propose a new framework for cloud-assisted EHR storage and sharing with privacy preservation and data security based on consortium blockchain. The cloud is used to store patients' EHR ciphertext while the consortium blockchain keeps reocrds of keyword ciphertext for data searching and sharing.
• We design the following core components for consortium blockchain: network model, data construction, and consensus mechanism. We define different entities, and stipulate their authority according to the demand of our system in the network. We design the block structure and transaction structure and incorporate cryptography primitives to store data securely. Furthermore, we put forward proof of authorization as the consensus mechanism for consortium blockchain.
• We present a cloud-assisted secure and privacypreserving EHR sharing protocol based on consortium blockchain. Only the authorized data requesters who have searching trapdoor are allowed to acquire the keywords and related information. Moreover, the authorization and other access services are accomplished by the blockchain accounts, which ensures identity privacy protection. Also, the cloud re-encrypts the EHR ciphertext and sends the re-encrypted ciphertext to specified data requester when they come to an agreement with the patient. The structure of the paper is organized as follows. An overview on existing works related to our research is presented in section II. Section III gives the key technologies prepared for our scheme. Section IV constructs the system architecture, EHR consortium blockchain and analyzes the threat model and security goals. The data structure and consensus mechanism of EHR consortium blockchain are designed in section V. Section VI describes details of the protocol and security proof. Later, we discuss how the protocol achieves security goals in section VII. Furthermore, we compute the computational overhead and communication overhead and evaluate the performance of our system by implementing it on Ethereum platform in section VIII. Finally, section IX summarizes the paper and looks ahead to the future.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss works that focus on EHR sharing with the help of cloud technology and blockchain technology.
A. EHR SHARING WITH CLOUD
In order to achieve data security during the process of EHR sharing, some access control schemes based on cloud were introduced in [3]- [5] . A new method of fine-grained access control called ciphertext-policy attribute-based signcryption and secure sharing of personal health records in cloud computing was proposed in [3] ; In [4] , an efficient and secure fine-grained access control scheme was presented which can realize authorized users to access EHRs in cloud storage. It supports some specific physicians to write on EHRs; [5] proposed a hierarchical comparisonbased encryption scheme and developed a dynamic policy updating scheme by using the proxy re-encryption technique to achieve dynamic access control in cloud-based EHR systems.
For improving the searchability and interoperability of EHR sharing, [6] proposed a new cloud-based EHR system supporting fuzzy keyword search for secure data sharing and effective utilization of the EHRs; [7] utilized conjunctive keyword search with proxy re-encryption to build a secure EHR searching scheme for data sharing between different medical institutions. Moreover, [8] proposed a general framework for secure sharing of EHRs that patients are allowed to securely store and share their EHR in the cloud server and doctors can access the EHRs in cloud.
B. EHR SHARING WITH BLOCKCHAIN
With the development of blockchain technology, its decentralized, traceability and anonymous characteristics have been widely concerned in applications of medical industry issues. At present, many scholars are focusing on the privacy and security in EHR sharing based on blockchain technology.
In order to help patients use and share their personal health data conveniently and safely, Amofa et al. [10] presented a blockchain architecture to realize the security control of personal data in health information exchange by matching intelligent contracts with user-generated acceptable policies. The architecture minimized data security risks by designing a mechanism to control the shared data. X. Zheng et al. [11] proposed a conceptual design for personal continuousdynamic health data sharing based on blockchain technology. It is supplemented by cloud storage, so as to share information related to personal health in a safe and transparent way. In [12] , an identity and access management system using blockchain technology to support the authentication and authorization of entities in digital systems was proposed. This system described the application of blockchain in Hyperledger Fabric framework for identity authentication and access management. Moreover, Guo et al. [14] proposed an attribute-based signature scheme with multiple authorities to ensure the effectiveness of encapsulated EHRs in the blockchain. In this scheme, the patient endorsed the message according to the attributes and only provided the evidence that he had attested to it.
Some schemes combine cloud technology with blockchain technology to improve the security of EHR sharing. Cao et al. [13] proposed a cloud-assisted secure eHealth system, using blockchain technology to protect outsourced EHRs in cloud from illegal modification. The key idea of this system was that EHRs can only be outsourced by authenticated participants. Each operation on the outsourced EHRs was integrated into public blockchain as a transaction. Liu et al. [18] proposed a blockchain-based privacypreserving data sharing scheme, namely, BPDS. In BPDS, the cloud was used to store the original EMRs securely and a tamper-proof consortium blockchain was designed to share the EMR indexes. The scheme used this way to reduce the risk of medical data leakage. The use of consortium blockchian ensures that the EMRs cannot be modified discretionarily. In [19] , a storage scheme and service framework were proposed for storing, sharing and using medical data based on blockchain and cloud. In this scheme, blockchainbased personal medical data applications can provide a patient medical information service without violating privacy concerns.
Another line of work focused on handling the privacy and access control of EHR sharing on blockchain. Reference [15] proposed a confidential data sharing model to support personal health record system based on blockchain technology and proxy re-encryption method. The model solved three important problems: privacy of on-chain data, limited storage for large medical data and consent revocation.
Reference [16] presented a blockchain-based system architecture to achieve an auditable medical data sharing and healthcare data access permission handling. In other aspects, Chen et al. [17] proposed a blockchain-based searchable encryption scheme for electronic medical record sharing to improve data searchability. In this scenario, the construction of EHR indexes stored in the blockchain were complex logical expressions, so that data users can use those logical expressions to search the indexes. Taking advantage of the decentralized property of blockchain, data owners had complete control over who can see their EHRs. The blockchain technology guarantees data integrity, anti-interference, and traceability.
Different from the above works, Zhang and Lin et al. [29] proposed a multi-typed blockchain-based secure and privacypreserving PHI sharing (BSPP) for diagnosis improvements. In BSPP, the private blockchain was used to store PHI for hospital and the consortium blockchain was responsible for recording the secure indexes of the PHI. The scheme used public key encryption with keyword search for realizing data security and privacy preservation of data sharing on consortium blockchain.
The aboving works proposed various EHR sharing schemes from different aspects. Generally, they presented an idea or concept while without detail solutions for a specific application scenarios. In our work, we combine keyword searchable encryption and proxy re-encryption technology to realize privacy-preserving and secure data sharing for EHR sharing based on consortium blockchain technology and cloud storage. Furthermore, we design the protocol in details.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give the technical preliminaries required in this paper.
A. BILINEAR MAPS
Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of the same prime order q. A bilinear mapê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is an admissible bilinear map if it satisfies the following properties:
5)ê can be efficiently computed.
B. COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS
Definition 1: Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). We suppose that E is an elliptic curve. The primitive element is P and X is another element in elliptic curve. Given E as the number of points on the curve, the ECDLP is looking for the integer b, where 1 ≤ b ≤ E, which satisfies the following:
In cryptosystems, the private key is usually an integer b and the public key X is a point on the curve with coordinates X = (x X , y X ).
ECDLP Assumption. It is assumed that it is difficult to solve the ECDLP in polynomial time.
Definition 2: Decision Linear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DLDH). We denote an elliptic curve E and consider a cycle group G 1 of prime order q. Let P 1 , P 2 , P 3 be random elements in G 1 and a 1 , a 2 , a 3 random numbers in Z * q . The DLDH problem is defined as follows: Given a tuple (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , a 1 P 1 , a 2 P 2 , a 3 P 3 ) ∈ G 1 as input, output 1 if a 3 = a 1 + a 2 and 0 otherwise. We define the advantage of an algorithm A to deciding the DLDH problem in G 1 as:
DLDH Assumption. If the probability of any t-time adversary successfully solving the problem is Adv 1 ≤ ε, where ε is negligible, it is assumed that it is hard to solve the DLDH problem in polynomial time.
Definition 3: Modified Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (m-DBDH). We denote E an elliptic curve and the primitive element is P. Consider cycle group G 1 and G 2 of prime order q. The m-DBDH is defined as follows: Given a tuple (P, cP, dP, T ) ∈ G 3 1 × G 2 as input, where c, d ∈ Z * q , decide whether T =ê(P, P) d/c .We define the advantage of an algorithm A to deciding the m-DBDH problem as:
m-DBDH Assumption: If the probability of any t-time adversary successfully solving the problem is Adv 1 ≤ ε, where ε is negligible, it is assumed that it is difficult to decide the m-DBDH in probabilistic polynomial time.
C. PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION WITH CONJUNCTIVE KEYWORD SEARCH
The public key encryption with conjunctive keyword search enables data requesters to search a document containing several keywords over a public key encryption setting. The scheme is defined as following algorithms [20] .
• KeyGen(1 k ): Given a security parameter 1 k as input, it outputs public/private key pair (pk, sk).
• PECK (pk, W ): It selects a keyword set W = {w 1 , w 2 · · · , w n }. It uses the public key to produce a searchable keyword encryption C w for W .
• Trapdoor(sk, Q): It takes the receiver's private key sk and the keyword query Q = ( 1 , 2 , · · · , t ) as input, and computes the trapdoor T Q for the conjunctive search of a given keyword query.
• Test(pk, C w , T Q ): It takes as input the public key pk, searchable keyword encryption C w and the trapdoor T Q . If Q is included in C w , the server outputs ''yes'', otherwise ''no''.
D. CONDITIONAL PROXY RE-ENCRYPTION
Conditional proxy re-encryption is a scheme which only allows the proxy with a re-encryption key to convert ciphertext satisfying a concrete condition. The re-encryption ciphertext encrypted by a delegator's public key and condition c can be decrypted by the delegatee who satisfies the condition c with his/her private key. The scheme consists of the following algorithms [21] .
• Setup(k): Given a security parameter k as input, the algorithm outputs the system's public parameter.
• KeyGen(i): This algorithm generates a public-private key pair (pk i , sk i ) for user.
• Enc(sk s , pk i , m): It takes the sender s's private key, the receiver i's public key and plaintext m as input, and returns ciphertext C m .
• ReKeyGen(pk s , sk i , pk j ): The delegator i generates a reencryption key by using his/her private key, the sender s's public key and delegatee j's public key.
• ReEnc(C m , rk): This algorithm takes as input ciphertext C m and re-encryption key rk, and outputs the reencryption ciphertext C m .
• Dec(C m , sk j ): It takes the re-encryption ciphertext C m and delegatee j's private key as input, and returns the plaintext m.
E. BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
Blockchain is an ordered list of records linked together through a chain on blocks [22] . It is essentially a decentralized database, which is a new application mode of distributed data storage, point-to-point transmission, consensus mechanism, encryption algorithm, and other computer technologies. It is also a distributed ledger that cannot be tampered or forged by using the cryptography method. Current blockchain systems can be categorized into three types: Public blockchain, private blockchain, and consortium blockchian [24] . Public blockchain is permissionless blockchain where all records are visible to the public and anyone can take part in the system and access information, for example, Bitcoin, Ethereum. A private blockchain is regarded as a centralized network since an organization fully controls the system. Consortium blockchain is a partially decentralized system since it is managed by several organizations. In consortium blockchain, only those nodes that come from authorized organizations can access data in blockchain. In our work, we conduct EHR data sharing on consortium blockchain. Several hospitals constitute an alliance and create a consortium blockchain, which keeps records of secure indexes for patient's EHR.
In blockchain, the way to reach consensus among untrust-worthy nodes in distributed environment is called consensus mechanism. The consensus mechanism is the core of blockchain technology. Proof of work, proof of stake, practical byzantine fault tolerance and some other consensus mechanism have been proposed for blockchain [24] - [28] . 
IV. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present the architecture for cloud-assisted consortium blockchain for EHR storing and sharing system. And then, we analyze the threats and put forward our security goals.
A. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
There are five entities in the proposed framework: Data owners (DO), data providers (DP), cloud server (CS), blockchain (BC), data requesters (DR), as shown in Fig. 1 .
1) DATA OWNERS
Date owners refer to patients who visit doctors in hospitals or medical institutions for medical service. The electronic health records including data of individual privacy will be produced after their interactions. As the source of health record, DO has the ownership and control rights for the data. They must register an account for data sharing on EHR consortium blockchain. The DP can upload health record to cloud after getting DO's authorization. Data requesters need DO's permission for accessing the data.
2) DATA PROVIDERS Data providers are doctors or administrators of hospitals who manager EHRs. When receiving a patient's authorization, they encrypt the health record and upload files to cloud server. Afterwards, they conduct a data transaction consisting of keyword ciphertext for EHR and DO's account address and send it to the transaction pool. They act as data transaction senders in blockchain, as shown in Fig. 2 . If a new DP wants to join the blockchain, he/she has to take three steps:
• Register an account in EHR consortium blockchain. • Submit a recommendation letter signed by one commissioner and send it to all of the commissioners.
• Get at least 2/3 of the authorizations from commissioners.
3) CLOUD SERVER
Cloud server is in charge of storing encrypted EHR provided by DP. It is also responsible for sending the file location to DO's account in EHR consortium blockchain. It is honest but curious about the data. In addition, it takes responsibility for re-encrypting EHR using re-encryption key.
4) DATA REQUESTERS
Data requesters refer to government, laboratory, clinic, and so on, who need to access patient's EHR. They have to get search trapdoor from DP and search for keywords in the blockchain at first, and then send a request to DO after getting search result. Once they get DO's authorization, they will receive the re-encrypted health record from cloud server. Their operation will generate service transactions that will be put into transaction pool, thus they act as service transaction senders in blockchain, as shown in Fig. 2 . They can join or exit blockchain network anytime as the ordinary users. They can see the whole consensus process and enjoy the services of the system.
B. CONSTRUCTION OF EHR CONSORTIUM BLOCKCHAIN
The proposed EHR consortium blockchain is composed by blocks which include keyword ciphertext, DO's account address, DP's signatures, and so on. In the blockchain, different members have different access right. Data requesters can perform keyword search and send data access request transactions to blockchain for data sharing. In blockchain network, the nodes should achieve a consensus to generate new blocks. Patients' information is in ciphertext and unlinked to their identities, hence the blockchain can protect their privacy effectively.
The EHR consortium blockchain is composed by four different nodes: commissioner (trusted authority), miner (data administrator), data transaction sender (data provider), service transaction sender (data requester), as show in Fig. 2 .
1) COMMISSIONERS
Several hospitals, clinics and medical center constitute an alliance committee and create a EHR consortium blockchain. Each organization owns a commissioner as the member of the alliance committee to execute their decisions. The commissioner is responsible for recommending and approving new data administrator, data provider and verifying valid transactions and blocks. Each commissioner have equal status in whole network. In practice, the commissioner can act as data administrator or data provider. Every block is sent to all of the commissioners for verification after at least 2/3 of the authorizations are received, the block will be marked as valid block.
2) DATA ADMINISTRATORS Data administrators are generated by random selecting from commissioners as a miner in the blockchain. They take charge of packing transactions and producing blocks. Each cooperative organization must provide at least one data administrator candidate for maintaining normal operation of blockchain.
Once getting the appointment, they will gather data transaction and service transaction from transaction pool and pack them into a block. Then, they sign the block and send them to all of the commissioners. When a valid block is added to blockchain network, they will get the deserved reward.
3) DATA TRANSACTION SENDERS
Data providers undertake the responsibility of data transaction sender. They were introduced in system architecture.
4) SERVICE TRANSACTION SENDERS
Data requesters undertake the responsibility of service transaction sender. They were introduced in system architecture.
C. THREAT MODEL AND SECURITY GOALS
In our scheme, cloud servers are semi-trusted. It is honest but curious about electronic health record. They may try to decrypt the ciphertext. Some malicious opponent may intercept, modify or counterfeit the health records during the transmissions. The cloud and data requesters may collude to deduce the plaintext of EHR.
Considering the above threat model, security goals are as follows:
1) DATA CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY
The patient's health records can't be read or modified by other entities without data owner's authentication, whatever it is stored in cloud server or transmitted in the public channel.
2) ACCESS CONTROL
The data owners have the ability to control the data access. Only getting the data owner's authorization can other entities access the health records.
3) AUTHENTICATION
Data owners should be able to authenticate data providers to ensure that health records come from reliable resource. Data requesters could be authenticated to guarantee legitimate use of data. The cloud server should be able to authenticate data owner, data provider, and data requester.
4) SECURE SEARCH
Data requesters need to get DP's authentication to search interested content in the EHR consortium blockchain. The same keyword in different searching is unlinkability such that the eavesdroppers can't speculate whether two or more EHRs come from the same source.
5) PRIVACY PRESERVATION
Data owner's identity information can't be revealed with EHR and account address. Moreover, the original EHR can't be revealed to illicit entities.
6) COLLUSION RESISTANCE
Even if an entity colludes with the cloud server, they can't access the original EHR without access permission. Besides, the DO and CS can't collude to decrypt the EHR. Moreover, any two data requesters can not speculate the information of EHR combined with the search trapdoor.
V. EHR CONSORTIUM BLOCKCHAIN DESIGN
In our scheme, a valid block is composed of block header, block body, data administrator's signature, and timestamp, as show in Fig. 3 . Block header contains five components: Block ID, block size, previous block hash, random number, and merkle root. Block ID is used for tracking software or protocol updating which is unique for each block; block size shows how much storage space the block takes up; previous block hash is used to link previous block for avoiding modification; random number is used for appointing the next miner; merkle root is a digital fingerprinting of the transactions set from the block body [23] . Block body has two parts: x data transactions and y service transactions (The optimal design of this quantity is beyond the scope of this article). Data transaction is made up of encrypted EHR and relevant information generated by authorized data provider; service transactions include keyword search, access request, and authorization etc. data administrator's signature helps to track the generator of the block. Timestamp indicates the generation time of the block.
2) TRANSACTION STRUCTURE
Data transaction is made up of transaction ID, transaction type, keyword ciphertext, DO's account, and DP's signature as show in Fig. 3 . Transaction ID can help to track source of the transaction; transaction type distinguishes different transactions to guarantee efficient operations; keyword ciphertext is provided for data searching; access request is sent to the DO's account for getting the access authorization; DP's signature provides proof of transaction's validity. A valid data transaction are required by all of the above information.
Service transaction consists of transaction ID, transaction type, service content, sender ID, and receiver ID as show in Fig. 3 . Service content may vary from keyword search, exchanging some information between two accounts, sending access request to one's account, and so on. In particular, a valid service transaction must have legal sender and valid receiver. This measure helps to reduce junk information in transaction pool and keep the network running normally and efficiently.
B. CONSENSUS MECHANISM (PROOF-OF-AUTHORIZATION)
We propose a consensus mechanism, named proof of authorization, to build the regulation for consortium blockchain and ensure high-efficiency, reliability and safety of the blockchain network as shown in Fig. 4 .
Assume that the number of commissioners is N c . We assign a random number M ∈ [0, N c − 1] to each commissioner in system setup. The system generates a random number M , 0 ≤ M < N c , appoints the matched commissioner as data administrator, and produces block in this round. The network will inspect the number of commissioners at next round of consensus and redistribute the number to them.
When a data provider sends data to the EHR consortium blockchain, the data transaction will be stored in the transaction pool at first. In the same way, when data requester submits a request, service transaction will be put into the transaction pool. The appointed data administrator packages x data transactions and y service transactions into a block. Then the block is sent to all of the commissioners.
If a commissioner verifies the block's validity and agrees to authorize the block, he/she will sign the block and return the signature to the data administrator. After receiving at least 2/3N c signatures, data administrator signs on the block and sends it to the NTP server. The NTP server provides the current timestamp, signs and encrypts the new block, then returns the timestamp and signature to the data administrator.
At last, the data administrator generates another random number M ∈ [0, N c −1] that determines who will be the next data administrator for producing new block and broadcasts to other nodes which can verify the time information of the block. If the total time of the process is less than specified time T max , the block is finally valid. Otherwise, the permissions of producing this block will be turned over to the data administrator M + 1(0 ≤ M < N c − 1). When a valid block is generated, it means that a round of consensus is finished.
VI. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, we first present an overview of the proposed protocol for cloud assisted EHR sharing with security and privacy-preservation based on EHR consortium blockchain. After that, we describe the proposed protocol in details and security proof.
A. OVERVIEW
The process of the proposed protocol is represented in Fig. 5 . The protocol is made up of three layers: Data generation layer, data storage layer, and data sharing layer. When a patient (DO) i with identity I i arrives at a hospital for a medical service, he/she needs to register an account in the EHR consortium blockchain. An account address A i and private key generated by the EHR consortium blockchain will be sent to the patient. The patient i sents data packet ϑ 0 = (I i A i ) to a doctor k. The original EHR m for patient i will be generated after interacting with the doctor (DP) k. The DP extracts a series of keyword w i from the EHR. Then, the DP encrypts m with the patient's public key pk i , the DP's private key x k and keyword w i , getting the EHR ciphertext C m . In addition, it encrypts w i with the DP's public key X k producing keyword ciphertext C w . After that, the DP sends data packet ϑ 1 = (C m C w A i ) to cloud server. The file location F i will be sent to the DO's account when the cloud server finished storing the data safely. Meanwhile, the DP sends data packet ϑ 2 = (C w A i C k ) to the EHR consortium blockchain, where C k is DP's signature for proof of conformance. Also, DP uses keywords w and his/her private key x k to produce a trapdoor T Q for keyword search.
If government, laboratory or clinic (DR) would like to search for some EHR, they first submit a search request to the DP. If the request is allowed, they will get a trapdoor T Q . Then the DR can find out the matched EHR and obtain the DO's account address A i by searching on the blockchain with T Q . Afterwards, they can send data packet ϑ 3 = (I j pk j X k A j ) to the DO's account for access request. When the DO receives data request notification, they will send an authorization including file location F i and keyword w i to DR's account. Additionally, it generates a re-encryption key rk and transmits it to CS, who carries out proxy reencryption for the required ciphertext. Finally, the DR uses his/her private key sk j to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext C m .
B. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
The proposed protocol is composed of three phases: System setup and registration, data storage and index generation, data sharing.
Phase 1: System Setup and Registration
System Parameter Generation: Given a security parameter k, the DP generates a prime q and selects a bilinear pairingê :
where G 1 is an additive cycle group and G 2 is a multiplicative cycle group with the same prime order q. P is the generator of G 1 . The DP chooses three different one-way 
collision-resistant hash function:
Furthermore, the DP randomly selects three parameter g 1 , g 2 , g 3 ∈ Z * q , and computes P 1 = g 1 P, P 2 = g 2 P, P 3 = g 3 P as the secret key of the system. Additionally, the DP randomly chooses x k ∈ Z * q as the master private key and computes the public key X k = x k P. Setĥ =ê(P, P). Finally, the system parameters is published as params = (q, P,ê, G 1 , G 2 , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , X k ,ĥ).
Registration: Both the DO and the DR register to DP for joining the system. The DO randomly chooses number x i ∈ Z * q as his/her private key sk i and computes Y i = x i P as his/her public key pk i . The DR randomly selects x j ∈ Z * q as his/her private key sk j and computes Y j = x j P as his/her public key pk j .
Phase 2: Data Storage and Index Generation
Data Generation: When a DO i visits a hospital and interacts with a DP k, the original EHR m ∈ {0, 1} * will be generated. The DP encrypts m with his/her private key x k , the DO's public key pk i and the keyword w i to generate EHR ciphertext C m by performing Algorithm 1.
Keyword Index Generation: The DP k selects a keyword set W = {w 1 , w 2 , · · · , w n } for original EHR and two random values u, v ∈ Z * q . It computes the searchable keyword ciphertext C w = (A, B, C 1 , C 2 · · · , C n ) by performing Algorithm 2.
When DP finished data and index generation, the data packet ϑ 1 = (C m C w A i ) is stored in cloud server and ϑ 2 = (C w A i C k ) is formated as a data transaction. 
Phase 3: Data Sharing
Keyword Search: The DP generates a keyword set = ( 1 , 2 , · · · , t ) searching trapdoor T Q for DR to search desired keyword on the consortium blockchain after receiving the search request from DR. The trapdoor T Q = (T Q 1 , T Q 2 , T Q 3 ) is generated by using DP's private key as Algorithm 3.
After getting keyword searching trapdoor, the DR searches keyword in the secure indexes on the EHR consortium blockchain to find out the indexes for DO i. The test algorithm is executed on the blockchain by checking the equalitŷ
. If the equation holds, the blockchain outputs ''yes'' to the DR and sends DO's account address A i to him/her. Otherwise, it aborts.
Correctness: We assume that the i in the keyword trapdoor T Q and w i in the ciphertext are equal, the correctness of the test algorithm is verified as:
Data Access: When the DR gets the DO's account address A i , he/she will send data packet ϑ 3 = (I j pk j X k A j ) for access request to the DO's account address A i . After getting the access request notification, the DO transmits data packet ϑ 4 = (H 3 (w i ) F i ) for authorization to DR's account address A j and generates re-encryption key rk = (rk 1 , rk 2 ) for cloud server, where rk 1 and rk 2 are calculated by Algorithm 4.
Then the re-encryption key rk is sent to the cloud server to re-encrypt the ciphertext from DP.
Upon receiving the re-encryption key, the cloud server carries out the Algorithm 5 to generate a re-encrypted ciphertext C m .
Then, the cloud server sends the re-encrypted ciphertext C m = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 , c 5 , c 6 ) to DR's account. The DR j is able to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext with his/her private key according to Algorithm 6
Correctness: The correctness of the Algorithm 6 is verified as:m 
C. SECURITY PROOF Theorem 1: The proposed PEKS is secure against IND-CR-CKA in the random oracle model assuming the DLDH assumption holds in G 1 .
The PEKS includes system setup and registration, Algorithm 2, Algorithm 3. The security model of indistinguishability of ciphertext from random against chosen keyword attacks (IND-CR-CKA) is the same as [20] .
Proof: See Appendix A. Theorem 2: The proposed CPRE is IND-CCA secure in the standard model assuming the m-DBDH assumption is intractable.
The CPRE includes system setup and registration, Algorithm 1, Algorithm 4, Algorithm 5, Algorithm 6. The security model of indistinguishability under Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (IND-CCA) is the same as [21] .
Proof: See Appendix B.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we demonstrate how the proposed protocol achieves the security goals effectively.
1) THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL CAN ACHIEVE DATA CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY
DP encrypts EHR with his/her private key, DO's public key and a series of keywords extracted from the EHR before sending them to cloud server. So the ciphertext can't be decrypted without DP's public key, DO's private key and keywords. The private key is secure under ECDLP assumption. In addition, only the entity that gets DO's authorization is allowed to access the data from cloud server. In practice, DO generates a re-encryption key with DR's public key, keyword, and file location. Then cloud server re-encrypts the EHR ciphertext with re-encryption key. Thus, only the intended DR can decrypt the ciphertext, which enhances data confidentiality. Furthermore, the signatures in each block can achieve data integrity.
2) THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL CAN ACHIEVE ACCESS CONTROL
In our system, DP sends a keyword trapdoor T Q to authorize DR for keyword searching in EHR consortium blockchain.
As encrypted by the DP's public key. Thus, DP can control data search. Moreover, when DO agrees DR to access his/her data, he/she will send them a packet which contains file location and keyword. Meanwhile, DO generates a re-encryption key rk and sends it to CS for performing proxy re-encryption.
Note that in rk = (rk 1 , rk 2 ), rk 1 
, which are related to DO's private key, DP's and DR's public key, file location, and keyword. In this way, only the authorized DR can decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext. Therefore, DO is able to control the access of his/her data.
3) THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL CAN ACHIEVE AUTHENTICATION
Our scheme can achieve both identity authentication and data authentication. The EHR consortium blockchain network distinguishes different nodes and their legality. DR can affirm whether the ciphertext sent by CS is the expected data by examining whether he/she has the ability of decrypting the ciphertext. The re-encryption key is generated by DO's private key, DP's and DR's public key, file location and keyword. It ensures that only the EHR ciphertext which is stored in designated location and encrypted by DO's public key can be re-encrypted. Only the authorized DR can decrypt the target ciphertext by using his/her private key with right file location and keyword.
4) THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL CAN ACHIEVE SECURE SEARCH
The keywords for searching are encrypted by DP's public key in consortium blockchain. DR has to get a searching trapdoor from DP for searching target keyword. So, during the process of DR searching, other entities can't know the search keywords and the searching result. According to Theorem 1, our scheme is IND-CR-CKA secure in random oracle model. The attackers can't find the relationship between encrypted keyword and searching trapdoor even though they get the trapdoor. As our scheme is IND-CCA secure in the standard model, according to Theorem 2, the cloud server only executes proxy re-encryption for prescriptive original ciphertext and sends it to specific DR. It is not allowed to obtain any information about original EHRs. Furthermore, DP is only authorized to access keywords without revealing other information.
5) THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL CAN ACHIEVE PRIVACY PRESERVATION
In the process of data transmission, the entity sends and receives data packets via his/her account in blockchain. The blockchain account is anonymous and unlinkable to real identity. So, the anonymity of blockchain can protect the public information from divulging the real identity of entities. Besides, during the process of keyword search, it will not reveal any information about DO. During the process of proxy re-encryption, the CS can't deduce the real identity of DO from the EHR ciphertext and re-encryption key.
6) THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL CAN ACHIEVE COLLUSION RESISTANCE
On the one hand, the EHR ciphertext is encrypted by DP's private key, DO's public key, and keyword. Even though DR colludes with CS, they can't decrypt any information from the ciphertext because they do not have DO's private key. On the other hand, the re-encryption key is generated with DR's and DP's public key, file location and keyword, so the reencryption ciphertext can't be decrypted without DR's private key. Thus, illegal DR isn't able to collude with CS to access the data.
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we firstly illustrate the parameters setting and platform setting and compare the security properties of the proposed scheme with other schemes. Then, we analyze the communication overhead of the proposed protocol and compare it with another scheme. Finally, we implement the proposed scheme on Ethereum platform and evaluate its performance.
A. PARAMETERS AND PLATFORM SETTING
The system parameter k = 128. We use Type A pairing on the elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + x over the field F p for some prime p = 3 mod 4, the same setting as [29] .The cryptographic primitives are implemented using Java language on a computer with Intel(R)Core(TM)i5-6500 CPU @ 3.20GHz 3.19GHz, 4.00 GB RAM, Windows 10 operating system.
We use Ganache(client version) to build a private test blockchain on macOS system. The data is written into smart contracts by using solidity language and uploaded to the Ethereum blockchain. The solidity compiler is solc@ 0.4.25 and the smart contracts test framework is mocha@6.2.0. Since solidity can not output the time cost of publishing smart contracts to blockchain, the Web3js library of Nodejs(Node is a development platform that lets JavaScript run on the server side) is used to interact with smart contracts on the blockchain and test the time cost of sending transactions. The specific configurations are shown in Table 7 .
B. COMPARISONS OF SECURITY PROPERTIES
We compared the security properties of the proposed scheme with cloud-based schemes Liu [3] , Wang [7] , and blockchainbased schemes Sandro [10] , Liu [18] . From the table 8, we can find all the schemes can achieve the properties of access control and privacy preservation, which is crucial security objectives in EHR sharing system.
C. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
We donate |G 1 |, |G 2 | the size of an element in group G 1 and G 2 , |Q| the size of the elements in Z * q , |σ | the size of signatures. The size of blockchain account is 32 bytes. The communication overhead is generated during the process of data generation, keyword search, and data access. At the data generation phase, the communication overhead between DP and CS comes from data packet ϑ 1 . The packet ϑ 1 is made up of C m , C w and A i , the total length is (n + 4) |G 1 | + (n + 1) |G 2 | + 3 |Q| +32 bytes. Additionally, the communication overhead between DP,DO, and DR is caused by ϑ 2 , which is composed of C w , A i and C k . The length of ϑ 2 is (n + 2) |G 1 | + n |G 2 | + |σ | +32 bytes. During the process of keyword search, the communication overhead of DR is 2 |G 1 | + |G 2 | bytes. At the data access phase, the communication overhead is 6 |G 1 | + 3 |G 2 | + 2 |Q| + 64 bytes, which is caused by ϑ 3 , ϑ 4 , rk and C m , as shown in Table 9 .
We compare our communication overhead with Zhang [29] . From Table 9 , we can find that our communication costs in the process of data access is higher than in Zhang [29] . Nevertheless, in the process of data generation and keyword search, our communication overhead is lower. This is because we use account on the blockchain in replace of pseudo identity. Moreover, our scheme store EHR ciphertext in cloud that avoids the communication overhead of proof of conformance in the private blockchain.
D. IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEAD
In order to quantify the operation time, we evaluate the performance of cryptographic primitives on the platform shown in section VIII.A. We record the computational overhead of algorithms by setting different keyword amounts in Table 10 .
In our protocol, the system setup and registration phase are simulated by the algorithm BuildSystem. The DataGen algorithm is used to encrypt original EHRs and generate ciphertext C m . The KeyInGen algorithm is responsible for generating searchable keyword ciphertext C w . The DR gets keyword searching trapdoor T Q from DP, searches the expected keyword and the matching test is executed in KeywordSearch algorithm. The re-encryption key rk and re-encrypted ciphertext C m are generated by algorithms ReKeyGen and ReEnc respectively. The ciphertext C m is decrypted by Dec algorithm.
Due to the fact that computational overhead of some algorithms are related to keyword amounts, we implement the algorithms by setting n = 10, n = 50, and n = 100, respectively. From table 10, we can find out that the time cost of DataGen, KeyInGen, KeywordSearch and ReKey-Gen algorithms increase with the size of keyword amounts. Because these algorithms contain keyword information and carry out some calculation about hash function of keyword. However, the BuildSystem, ReEnc and Dec algorithms are not affected by keyword set.
The length of data package is a critical factor affecting the time cost of sending a transaction in the blockchain. According to section VIII.C, the length of data package ϑ 2 in keyword index generation phase is (n+2) |G 1 |+n |G 2 |+|σ | +32 and ϑ 3 , ϑ 4 in data sharing phase is 6 |G 1 |+3 |G 2 |+2 |Q|+64. The |G 1 |, |G 2 |, |σ |, |Q| are 64 bytes, 384 bytes, 32 bytes, and 32 bytes respectively. Thus, the size of transactions Tx 1 = 448n + 192 bytes and Tx 2 = 1664 bytes. As the Tx 1 is related to keyword amounts n, we implement the transactions on Ethereum platform by setting n = 10, n = 50, and n = 100. The time cost are shown in table 11.
From table 11, we can know that the time cost of sending transactions to the blockchain is proportional to the length of data package. So, the amounts of the keyword set should not be too large to improve the efficiency of the transactions. Furthermore, the gas consumption increases with the increase of the length of data package. But, the consumption of gas is small and acceptable.
IX. CONCLUSION
In our work, we have proposed a blockchain-based EHR sharing scheme with conjunctive keyword searchable encryption and conditional proxy re-encryption to realize data security and privacy preservation of data sharing between different medical institutions. Firstly, we present a framework for EHR sharing among different entities based on cloud-assisted storage and blockchain. The cloud is in charge of storing EHR ciphertext while EHR indexes are kept on EHR consortium blockchain. Secondly, the network model, data structure and consensus mechanism for EHR consortium blockchain are designed to guarantee efficient operations of the system. Moreover, we use keyword searchable encryption to ensure data security with searchability and employ conditional proxy re-encryption to realize data sharing with privacy preservation. Furthermore, we conduct security analysis and proof security of the proposed protocol, which demonstrates that our scheme can achieve the designed security goals. We also implement the scheme on Ethereum platform and evaluate the performance of computational overhead and communication overhead.
For future work, we will implement the scheme on Hyperledger Fabric and perfect smart contracts for running the algorithms of data sharing.
APPENDIX

A. SECURITY PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Suppose that A is an outsider adversary with advantage ε in attacking the proposed protocol against IND-CR-CKA and H 1 (·), H 2 (·) the role of random oracles. We build a challenger C who can compute the solution of the DLDH problem by playing game with A as follows.
• Setup: Given the DLDH parameters (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , Q 1 , Q 2 , Q 3 ) where Q 1 = a 1 P 1 , Q 2 = a 2 P 2 and Q 3 = (a 1 + a 2 )P 3 or z. Challenger C randomly chooses x ∈ Z * q as the DP's private key and computes y = xP 1 . Additionally, it picks a number α ∈ Z * q randomly and keeps it secretly. Then, it sends A the system parameters params = (G 1 , G 2 ,ê, H 1 (·), H 2 (·), P) and the public key pk = y while the x is unknown for A. H 1 queries: C maintains a list of tuples (w i , c i , h i , u i ) called H 1−list for responding the queries of H 1 . A queries the random oracle H 1 at most q m keyword. When receiving the queries, challenger C responds as follows:
1) If the query w i already in H 1−list , C responds h i = H 1 (w i ). Otherwise, it generates a random c i ∈ {0, 1}. 2) If c i = 0, C selects a random number u i ∈ Z * q and computes h i ← u i P 1 . Otherwise, it sets h i ← u i P 3 .
3) C adds the tuples (w i , c i , h i , u i ) to H 1−list and returns h i to A. H 2 queries: C maintains a list of tuples (w i , c i , f i , v i ) called H 2−list for responding the queries of H 2 . When A queries the random oracle H 2 , challenger C responds as follows:
1) If the query w i is already in H 2−list , C responds f i = H 2 (w i ). Otherwise, it generates a random c i ∈ {0, 1}. 2) If c i = 0, C selects a random number v i ∈ Z * q and computes f i ← v i P 2 . It computes v i = u i α and sets f i ← v i P 3 .
3) C adds the tuples (w i , c i , f i , v i ) to H 2−list and returns f i to A.
• Phase 1: A queries some keyword set to trapdoor oracle. Trapdoor queries: A adaptively queries a keyword set Q i = ( i,1 , · · · , i,t ) to get a trapdoor T Q i . C responds as follows:
1) C executes the above algorithms for responding H 1 , H 2 queries to get two lists (w i,j , c i,j , h i,j , u i,j ) and (w i,j , c i,j , f i,j , v i,j ). 2) if there is any c i,j = 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, then C aborts. Otherwise, it picks a random number z i ∈ Z * q and computes
where T Q i,1 = z i P 1 , T Q i,2 = z i t j=1 u i,j P 1 and T Q i,3 = z i t j=1 v i,j P 1 .
• Challenge: A outputs a target keyword set W * and sends it to C. C performs as follows:
1) It chooses a keyword set W randomly and sets W 0 = W * and W 1 = W where W 0 = { 0,1 , · · · , 0,n }, W 1 = { 1,1 , · · · , 1,n }. The only restriction is that the previous trapdoors can't distinguish W 0 and W 1 .
2) It picks a random number β ∈ {0, 1} and queries all keywords of W β to H 1 , H 2 oracles. Then it gets lists (w β,i , c β,i , h β,i , u β,i ) and (w β,i , c β,i , f β,i , v β,i ). 3) If there is any c β,i = 1 for all i, it computes a challenge ciphertext C w = (A, B, C β,1 , · · · C β,n ) where A = a 1 P 1 , B = αa 2 P 2 and C β,i = u β,i Q 1 + αv β,i Q 2 (if c β,i = 0) or C β,i = u β,i Q 3 (if c β,i = 1). Otherwise, it aborts. 4) Returns (W 0 , W 1 , C w ) to A.
• Phase 2: A performs trapdoor queries as in phase 1. The restriction is that the generated trapdoor is indistinguishable for W 0 and W 1 .
• Guess: A outputs a guess β ∈ {0, 1}. The challenger C will win the game if β = β , which means Q 3 = (a 1 + a 2 )P 3 . Otherwise, it will lose, which means Q 3 = z.
In the guess phase, if Q 3 = (a 1 +a 2 )P 3 , which means the challenge ciphertext is a valid encryption of the keyword set W β . In this case, the view of A is the same as the view in a real attack and it must have probability 1/2 + ε at least. Thus, the challenger C's advantage to solve the DLDH problem is ε 1 ≥ ε.
B. SECURITY PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Suppose that A is an adversary with advantage ε in attacking the proposed protocol against IND-CCA. We build a challenger C who can compute the solution of the m-DBDH problem by playing game with A as follows.
• Setup: Given a security parameter k, challenger C generates the system parameters params = (q, P, G 1 , G 2 ,ê,ĥ, t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , H ) and sends it to A, wherê h =ê(P, P), t 1 = r 1 P, t 2 = r 2 P, t 3 = r 3 P for randomly choosing three numbers r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ∈ Z * q , H : {0, 1} * → Z * q is a one-way collision-resistant hash function.
• Phase 1: A makes some queries.
Public key queries: challenger C randomly picks x k ∈ Z * q and d k ∈ {0, 1}. If d k = 1, C chooses sk k = x k VOLUME 7, 2019
